How this is protected, and what it cannot protect you from

Written for the people who use it. Everything below is a claim you can check against the code, and the limits are here because a security page that lists only strengths is an advertisement.

The short version

Your vault is encrypted and decrypted in your browser. The server stores what it cannot read, and has never held a key that would open any of it. If somebody took the whole database tonight, they would have a great deal of ciphertext and no way through it.

What opens your account

Two things, and both are needed. Your master password, which only you know, and your Secret Key, which was made in your browser and printed on your Emergency Kit. Together they produce a key through Argon2id, a deliberately slow calculation, and that key never leaves the machine you are sitting at.

Signing in does not send either of them. The server offers a one-time number, your browser signs it, and the server checks the signature against a public key. Nothing that crosses the wire could be replayed, and a convincing copy of this site on another address would receive a signature that is useless here.

What the server can see

It cannot see a title, a username, a password, a note, a file, a tag or an expiry date. Those are things only your browser can read, which is why an expiry reminder appears in Watchtower rather than arriving as an email: no job on the server could know a date it cannot decrypt.

When a client sends you credentials

A vault can open a drop box: a link for somebody with no account who has credentials to hand over. The box has a key pair of its own. The public half rides in the link; the private half is sealed under the vault key and stored by the server, which cannot use it. The client's browser seals each credential to the public half before sending, so the link can only add — it shows nothing, not even what has already been sent — and a member's browser later opens the envelopes and files them as ordinary items.

If a member has the server email the link, the server sees the link while it does so. If they copy it and send it themselves, the server never sees the key at all. Either way, the key is a public key: somebody who finds the link can post junk into the box for the team to discard, and can read nothing.

What this cannot protect you from

How recovery works, and why it is safe

Your browser makes one recovery key, seals a copy of your own keys with it, splits that key so any two of your named colleagues can rebuild it, and seals each share to one of them. No single colleague can do anything alone, and the server holds only boxes it cannot open.

When somebody asks for their account back, each colleague is shown twelve symbols and asked to read them back to that person by voice before releasing anything. That conversation is the whole defence. A server cannot tell whether the person asking is really them, and neither can a screen; only somebody who knows their voice can.

What the rules can and cannot do

An organisation can refuse share links, cap how long one lives and how often it may be opened, and the server keeps those rules. It can also ask for a minimum master password length, a lock timeout and no exports, and those are requests: they are applied by every honest browser and could be ignored by a modified one. The settings screen marks each rule as enforced or advisory for exactly that reason.

SaaSForest Vault. Questions about any of this should go to whoever administers your vault.